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OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SIDNEY M. HORMAN, individually 
and as partner in HORMAN CON-
STRUCTION COMPANY, a Utah 




S. SPENCE CLARK, as general 
partner for VALLEY SHOPPING 
ASSOCIATES, a Utah limited 
partnership, 
Defendant. 
Supreme Court No. 20239 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
S. M. HORMAN, as General Partner 
for HORMAN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, a Utah Partnership 
and S. M. HORMAN, JR. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action in which the plaintiff/a^pelIants 
sought to recover damages for alleged breach of a contract 
creating an easement granted to them by respondents. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The lower court entered a memorandum decision and 
verdict against the plaintiffs in favor of the defendants of no 
cause of action. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellants, by this appeal, seek a decision 
reversing the trial court's decision of no cause of action and 
directing the trial court to enter a money judgment in favor of 
the appellants based upon the evidence presented at the trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In this case, the appellants take few, if any exceptions 
to the facts as set forth in the Memorandum Decision and 
therefore set forth the facts as found in the Memorandum 
Decision. (TRANSCRIPT PAGES 453-458) 
Plaintiffs were owners of a tract of land lying north of 
and contiguous to the Valley Shopping Center owned by defendant 
and located at the northeast corner of the intersection of 4500 
South and State Streets in Murray, Utah. Defendant had acquired 
the shopping center from Horman in about 1970. The tract of land 
owned by plantiffs was vacant property being held by plaintiffs 
for future development. 
Being desirous of obtaining a break in the traffic 
control island along State Street to afford access to the center 
by southbound traffic, the defendant determined that it could do 
so only by dedicating land for construction of a road from State 
Street eastward to Fairbourne Avenue. Defendant thus commenced 
negotiations with Horman for a conveyance of a portion of their 
respective parcels of land to Murray City for construction of 
said roadway. These negotiations culminated in the execution of 
an agreement between plaintiff and defendant dated July 5/ 1975/ 
but which was not signed by S. M. Horman for the Construction 
Company until September, 1975, and was not signed by defendant 
until March, 1976. Both signatures were acknowledged before a 
notary public. (See Appendix Exhibit A for entire agreement). 
The agreement provided that Horman would deed to Murray 
City the south 35 feet of its parcel of land running east and 
west for about 460 feet and that defendant would deed to Murray 
City the north 15 feet of its shopping center land from State 
Street to Fairbourne Street; that defendant would obtain a deed 
from American Motors to Murray City of the south 35 feet of its 
property fronting on State Street and contiguous to Horman's 
parcel on the west, (about 150 feet in length) and that Horman 
would not be required to pave the, street. The agreement also 
contained the following provision: 
It is understood between both parties 
hereto that Property Management and/or 
Valley Shopping Center Assoc, will permit 
Horman or its assigns with parking 
privileges for Horman or Horman invitees 
or assigns to park on the parking lot in 
the rear of the Valley Shopping Center 
in any of the stalls which are used for 
public parking. 
The agreement contained a legal description of the shopping 
center property. 
Both parties had a signed and notarized copy of the 
agreement. However, upon final execution of the agreement 
neither party had the agreement recorded in the County Recorder's 
office and it remained unrecorded until January 12, 1978, when S. 
M. Horman came upon the agreement in his files and took it to the 
Recorder's office where, upon determining that it had never been 
recorded, he then recorded it. 
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However, on March 15, 1977, a real estate exchange 
agreement was executed by six parties, namely Sterling Furniture, 
Modern Enterprises, W. Meeks Wirthlin and wife, Prowswood, 
Auerbachs and defendant by which defendant agreed to and did 
convey its interest in the Valley Shopping Center to the 
Wirthlins, subject only to a first mortgage ($423,329)/ to a 
mortgage to Murray City that secured defendant's obligation to 
pave the street/ and to "encroachments, easements and 
restrictions of record." The agreement required defendant to 
deposit by March 15, 1977 a preliminary title report by 
Associated Title Co. showing good and marketable title in Valley 
and a warranty deed conveying the Center to the Wirthlins. This 
requirement was met and the warranty deed contained the provision 
that the property was subject, among other things, to "easements, 
covenants, restrictions, rights or way/ encroachments and 
reservations appearing of record or enforceable in law or 
equity." 
Since the agreement between plaintiff and defendant had 
not been recorded as of March 15, 1977, and was not recorded 
until March 12, 1978, as stated supra, no mention thereof was 
made in the title report. The agreement of March 15, 1977, 
reserved $46,000 from the funds to be paid to defendant to cover 
the cost of paving the roadway to be built upon the land conveyed 
to Murray City, and which in fact was constructed and completed. 
The warranty deed to the Wirthlins was recorded on March 
15, 1977 by the title company handling the real estate exchange. 
Thereafter the Wirthlins sold their interest in Valley Shopping 
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Center to Arnold Development who in turn sold it to G. G. 
Finlayson and Janet F. Griffin who owned the center at the time 
of trial. 
At the time Korman recorded the agreement between the 
parties in March/ 1978/ he made no inquiry as to the then 
ownership status and thus did not know of the sale of the center 
by defendant to the Wirthlins. In 1980 the Horman property was 
conveyed to S. M. Horman, Jr./ as trustee for his family and he 
then undertook to develop the property for business purposes. 
Horman, Jr., obtained a building permit from Murray City 
about July 1, 1980, and commenced to build the outside walls with 
the intent to complete 20 interior units as lessees were obtained 
so each leased unit could be installed and completed in 
accordance with the desires of each lessee. The building permit 
records of Murray City left something to be desired, but minutes 
of a commission meeting dated May 1, 1980 reflected that Horman 
had explained that off-street parking for his building would be 
provided on a lot located on the south side of 4370 South Street, 
the street Duilt pursuant to the agreement between the parties. 
As Horman proceeded with the construction of the 
building the difficulty leading to the filing of this lawsuit 
began to take shape when Finlayson learned in some way of the 
apparent parking easement which resulted in a letter by his 
attorney dated September 30, 1980, to Arnold Development 
requesting an adjustment in the purchase price because of the 
reported easement. A copy of this letter was designated for 
Horman Construction Co. On November 17, 1980, Finlayson1s lawyer 
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wrote a letter to Horman Construction attaching a copy of a 
letter written by Associated Title Co. dated November 3, 1980, 
which expressed the view that because of the late recording of 
the agreement between plaintiff and defendant, any easement for 
parking granted therein was ineffective against the Wirthlins and 
the subsequent purchasers. By letter dated December 30, 1980, S. 
M. Horman responded thereto and continued to assert the easement 
was valid and discussed in detail the problems that would arise 
should the Horman business development lose its parking spaces. 
In the months that followed, Murray City issued a stop 
order on the construction; building plans were altered and 
off-street parking spaces were constructed on the Horman property 
but these were about 22 spaces short of meeting the Murray City 
ordinance requirements for parking; negotiations were undertaking 
by the Hormans with Finlayson to obtain spaces in the center; and 
leases were let based upon Murray City's approval of interior 
construction for a 57% occupancy. The negotiations for parking 
in the center's parking lot between plaintiffs and defendant did 
not result in a successful conclusion so this lawsuit was filed 
March 16, 1981, and at the time of trial the occupancy allowance 
remained the same and the negotiations between Horman and 
Finlayson were still being pursued as they had been during the 
period 3 1/2 years. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS ON APPEAL 
POINT ONE. THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES 
ESTABLISEHED A VALID EASEMENT IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFFS. 
POINT TWO. THE RECORDING STATUTE IS NOT RELEVANT TO 
DEFENDANT'S CONTRACTUAL DUTIES TO PLAINTIFFS. 
POINT THREE. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE 




THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES ESTABLISHED A VALID EASEMENT IN 
FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS. 
Generally, an easement is an interest in land in and 
over which is to be enjoyed, and is distinguishable from a 
license, which merely confers a personal privilege to do some act 
on the land. LOGAN V. McGEE, 320 So. 2d 792 (Miss. 1975). 
Where a license is coupled with an interest, the 
interest conferred is not merely permission but amounts to a 
grant or an easement. ULAN v. VEND-A-COIN, INC., 558 P.2D 741 
(Ariz App 1976). Corbin states further: 
"It is clear, if the owner of land contracts to give 
another person an irrevocable privilege of user for a 
substantial period, the transaction is more than a 
mere license. Such person gets an interest in land 
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within the Statute of Frauds. The interest then in-
cludes manifold rights against third persons and 
easily attains the dignity of the name easement." 
Corbin on Contracts. 
Thus, whether an instrument conveying a right to use the property 
of another, conveys an easement or lecense depends upon the 
intent of the parties. This can be interpreted from the language 
used and from the surrounding circumstances, viewed n light of 
the applicable rules of law and intent. COOPER v. BOISE CHURCH 
OF CHRIST OF BOISE, 524 P.2d 173 (Idaho 1974). 
It is clear from the following language that what was 
intended to be conveyed between Valley and Horman was an 
easement: 
"Property Management and/or Valley Shopping Center Asso-
ciated will permit Horman or its assigns with parking 
privileges for Horman or "Horman ' s invitees to park on 
the parking ]ot in the rear of the Valley Shopping 
Center in any of the stalls which are used for public 
parking." 
The right was granted to Horman or its assigns. It is not 
revocable. This clearly indicates that an interest in land was 
granted rather than merely * personal privilege. 
Further^cie, the agreement between Valley and Horman met 
the formal leqal requirements and created a valid contract right 
for a transfer of interest in land. There existed certainty of 
terms and certainty of the tract to be conveyed. The agreement 
was reduced to writing and signed by the parties, thus satisfying 
the Statute of Frauds. Corbin on Contracts has clearly 
established that: 
"an easement is a combination of legal relations of 
such importance effecting an use and enjoyment of land 
that any contract providing for the creation of an 
easement is within the Statute." (referring to the 
Statute of Frauds) 
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In the case of HAYNES v. HUNT, 85 P.2d 861 (Utah 1939), 
the Utah Supreme Court found a license. However, in 
describing the creation of an easement, the court said that 
whether a grant creates an easement is to be determined from the 
intention of the parties as gathered from the language of the 
instrument. The grant should be construed to carry out that 
intention. If the language is uncertain or ambiguous, the courts 
look to the surrounding circumstances. 
It is clear in this case that what the parties intended 
to create was an easement. That was their clear intent as 
demonstrated by their negotiations and as stated in the written 
agreement, and the agreement should be interpreted in light of 
the intent of the parties. 
POINT TWO 
THE RECORDING STATUTE IS NOT RELEVANT TO DEFENDANT'S CONTRACTUAL 
DUTIES TO PLAINTIFFS. 
It is clear from the Memorandum Decision of Judge Croft 
that he was swayed heavily in his decision on plaintiff's breach 
of contract cla^ .n by the plaintiff's failure to record the 
parking agreement (See pages 8-10 of the Memorandum Decision 
Appendix Exhibit B). In so doing, the trial court has misapplied 
the Utah law as it applies to the parties to the recordable 
contract. 
Plaintiffs concede that the agreement between Horman and 
Valley was not recorded prior to the sale of the property to 
Wirthlins. The Wirthlins were thus bona fide purchasers as they 
took without actual nor constructive notice of Horman's claim. 
Bona fide purchasers rules, or the public records doctrine, are 
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to protect innocent third parties such as the Wirthlins. 
However, these rules are not for the protection of a breaching 
party. The Public Records Doctrine states that the law: 
"Was intended to protect innocent third parties who 
have no knowledge of the existence of any rights 
and/or claims against the property by allowing them 
to take free and clear of any such unrecorded claims." 
MOTWANI v. FUN CENTERS, INC., 388 So. 2d 1173 (La. 
App. 1980). 
The failure to record had no effect on the obligations 
of the parties to the agreement. The Utah Supreme Court held in 
the case of MITCHELL v. PALMER, 240 P.2d 970 (Utah 1952), that a 
deed need not be acknowledged to be valid between the parties 
thereto. The Court relied on Section 78-1-6 of the Utah Code 
which provides that a conveyance of real estate must be recorded 
in order to impart notice. However, it further stated that, even 
without the recording, the conveyance shall be valid and binding 
between the parties thereto without such proofs, 
acknowledgements, certification, or record. 
The District Court of California further stated: 
"An unrecorded deed is valid between the parties 
thereto and persons who have notice thereof." 
WINEBERG v. MOORE, 194 F. Supp. 12 (D.C. Cal. 1961). 
Thus, whether the conveyance was recorded or not, has no bearing 
on Horman's claim for breach of contract by Clark. The 
conveyance was binding as to the parties thereto and a breaching 
party cannot rely upon a recording statute to establish his 
innocence of a breach. 
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POINT THREE 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE RESPONDENT CLARK DID NOT 
BREACH ITS CONTRACT WITH APPELLANT. 
In every contract there exists a duty of good faith and 
fair dealing. The Restatement Second, Section 205 states: 
"Every contract imposes upon each party, a duty of 
good faith and fair dealing in its performance and 
in its enforcement." 
The Utah Supreme Court further explained in TANNER v. 
BAADSGAARD, 612 P.2d 345 (Utah 1980): 
"When the parties have entered into a formal contract, 
such as for the purchase of real property, it is to be 
assumed that they will cooperate with each other in 
good faith for its performance, and one refusing to 
so perform, or claiming a forfeiture thereof, has the 
burden of showing the justification for doing so." 
The Tanner case was an action for a specific performance for the 
sale of undeveloped property lots. This was certainly analogous 
to the sale of the easement right in the present case. The Utah 
Supreme Court has clearly found that there exists a duty of good 
faith in a property interest transaction. 
In the case of FERRIS v. JENNINGS, 595 P.2d 857 (Utah 
1979), the record owner of property brought an action to evict 
the Defendant from the premises. The Defendant filed a 
Counterclaim asserting that she had a right to possess the 
property and to purchase it under an oral agreement with the 
record owner. In holding for the Defendant, the Court stated: 
" . . . parties to a contract are obligated to 
proceed in good faith, to cooperate in performing 
the contract in accordance with its expressed intent." 
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In light of the above, it is obvious that there existed 
in the agreement between Valley and Horman a duty of good faith. 
The parties had a duty to cooperate and to fairly deal with one 
another. Valley's obligation of fair dealing and good faith 
resulted in the obligation of permitting Horman parking 
privileges. This is not an implied term/ it is the very essences 
of the contract. The Restatement Second, Section 235 says: 
"When performance of a duty under a contract is due, 
any non-performance is a breach." 
The Defendant here clearly breached the parking agreement by 
granting two conflicting interests in the same property. As 
Corbin has stated: 
"Nevertheless; a contract created duties, . . . " 
and a breach of contract may be committed by pre= 
vention, hinderance or repudiation." 
In In Re DILLON v. MORGAN 362 So. 2d 1130 (La. App. 
1978), the vendor was trying to reserve one-half of the mineral 
rights on property he had previously sold for himself after no 
reservation had been made in the original contract. The Court 
there stated: 
"A seller should not be allowed to obligate himself 
to deliver and to warrant title and peaceful 
possession to a buyer of a thing and then by his 
own act or claim derogate from, or assert rights 
to the thing, contrary to his obligations." 
The Georgia Supreme Court in considering a similar 
situation, make the obvious declaration: 
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"It is axiomatic that after a grantor has sold land 
to one grantee, he cannot thereafter convey legal 
title to the same land to another grantee." PEARSON 
v. SHADIX, 229 S.E. 2d 653 (Ga. 1976). 
The breach of contract alleged by Appellants is not 
complicated. The Respondent first bargained and sold a part of 
their property to the Appellant and then less than twelve months 
later sold the same property/ together with other property 
rights, to another party for additional consideration. In so 
doing/ the Respondent received double consideration and created 
conflicting property rights among the purchasers. In the 
negotiations with Wirthlin7 Respondent never informed Wirthlin 
that he had sold part of the property rights to Appellant nor did 
he reserve in any of the contracts or deeds any rights for the 
Appellant. 
The Respondent now argues that there is nothing improper 
in his conduct. He argues that Appellant's failure to record 
voided the contract/ thereby enabling him to sell the property to 
another party. This theory is indeed novel and is without any 
authority in either law or equity. 
It is common practice in this State for Uniform Real 
Estate Contracts not to be recorded. If Respondent's proposition 
is adopted, then a Seller of real property can sell his property 
successively ad infinitim receiving new consideration from each 
buyer and then maintain that he is protected and exonerated from 
any of his contractual obligations to any of the buyers 
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because no one recorded. He would, thus, not be subject to any 
contractual claims from any of the buyers. Obviously, such a 
position is obsurd, yet it is the one precisely maintained by the 
Respondent. 
The courts have repeatedly held that a party cannot 
avoid a performance of an obligation by placing his performance 
beyond his control or by his own voluntary act, see CANNON v. 
STEVENS SCHOOL OF BUSINESS, INC., 560 P.2d 1383; PACIFIC VENTURE 
CORP. v. HUEY, 15 Cal 2d 711, 104 P.2d 641 (1940); ZOGARTS v. 
SMITH, 194 P.2d 143; 86 CA 2d 165; MORH v. SEARS 395 P.2d 117, 
239 Or 41 (1964). 
In a similar case, a father tried to avoid a contract 
for the sale of his property to his son by selling to a third 
party. The Court held that the Defendant had a duty not to 
repudiate or make performance impossible or more difficult by 
conveying his land to a third person, see THOMPSON v. THOMPSON 
460 P.2d 679, 1 Wash. App. 196 (Wash 1969). 
In the case of MARLOW INVESTMENT CORP. v. RADMALL, 26 UT 
2d 124, 485 P.2d 1402 (1971), this Court in considering a breach 
of contract case on multiple sales of property, concluded that 
the breach of contract occurs when the seller has not lost his 
ownership or title and can no longer fulfill his contract. In 
that case, the Court concluded that the buyer's right to sue for 
breach of contract ripened when the seller had conveyed the 
property to someone else after making an original deal with the 
Plaintiffs. 
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The Utah Supreme Court's position in JOHNSON v. BELL, 
666 P.2d 308 (Utah 1983), provides excellent authority for 
Appellant's position. This was an action to quiet title to 
certain real property or, in the alternative, to recover damages. 
The Court found that the Plaintiff's claim to title under an 
unrecorded Quit-Claim Deed was not valid and binding as to the 
Defendant's Trust Deed. The Plaintiffs in this suit were 
successors in interest to the original purchasers. The Court 
found that since there had been no contractual relationship 
between the Plaintiff and Defendant, no contractual liability was 
present. The Court said that: 
If any cause of action for damages exist against 
Bell (the Defendant) because of breach of some 
contractual duty, such cause of action would be 
owned by the original grantees and not by the 
Plaintiffs. (Id. at p. 312) 
Thus, the Court recognized a contractual cause of action for 
damages based upon a contract bewteen the original gtantor and 
the original grantee. It is this contractual cause of action 
upon which Plaintiffs' claim is based. 
SUMMARY 
In summary, the contract agreement satisfied all legal 
requirements and created a valid easement. Consequently, there 
existed a contract duty of good faith and fair dealing and 
failure to comply with that duty constituted a breach. There was 
a clear breach of contract created when the selling party 
(Respondents) gave two conflicting interests in the same 
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property. There exists an enforceable contract right between the 
parties for the conveyance of an interest in land. The failure 
to record has no effect upon the parties right to damages for 
breach of that contract. 
Respectfully submitted, 
NTZE & BROWN 
.ghland Dr., #202 
Salt Lake City, UT 84117 
Attorney for Appellants 
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THIS AGREEMENT, entered into this 7th day of July, 1970, by and 
between Valley Shoopinq Center Assiciates of Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, hereinafter referred to as "Valley" and 
HORMAN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
hereinafter referred to as Horman. 
WITNESSETH: 
Valley is desirous of opening up a road through from 
State Street to Fairbournc Street. 
Herman owns a parcel of land located immediately north of the Valley 
Shopping Center building runninq easterly to Fairbourne Street. 
Horman hereby agrees to deed to Murray City the south strip of 
this land 35 feet wide running east and west approximately 460 feet. 
Property Management ownst;he Valley Shopping Center located ULi*L* ',&,*+# 
immediately south of the Horman property and the American Motors ,. , 
property and Valley Shopping Center agrees to also deed a 15 feet 
wide strip of land running from State Street on the west to Fair-
bourne on the east making a 50 foot right-of-way for a road from 
State Street through to Fairbourne. 
It is also understood that Prooerty Management will obtain a deed 
from American Motors. Herein American Motors will deed 35 feet 
of the south end of their property running from State Street east 
to the llornan property. Thus permitting a thoroughfare through 
from State Street easterly to Fairbourne. 
It is understood between both parties hereto that Property Manage-
ment and or Valley Shopping Center, Assoc, will permit Horman or 
it 3 assigns with parking privileges for Horman or Horman invitees ov «.«il?u-
to park on the parking lot in the rear of the Valley Shopping Ccnttr 
in any of the stalls which are used for public parking, 
it i« agreed by l>oth parties hereto thai each ptrty has paid unto 
the nt.'ier party SI0.00 ,ip.d other good r^d valuable consideration, 
a receipt of whieh Is herehy acknowledged. It ii hereby agreed 
and understood that yiojman will not bo rocmired to psvo the street. HUT iiorman > 
' j i f inv Shoprunq Crnter A s s o c i a t e s HERMAN CONPTRVCTIOW OWPANV 
S, M. Horman, Pruftident 
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c ..••cuti.'il tiu1 rvmo. 
MCTARY PUBLIC
 / . J* 
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V.. ',1 l-V.M g 
;s . 
.ir.ty o r ' . l i t MV.r) 
^ f.;nn> d.iy of
 yyf g x * 19:j£i» personally appeared 
•;• r r< r« ^^.^^^ , ^ . , f y^  # one of the aiqners of 
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• V. r ^ r " - i ,• f r c i n s t r u r c r . t , who d u l y a c V. now I o Iqed t o 
.Av* * t * V 
» , * . . . ,** %• / * j \ ^ » 
NOTARY ruDMC / •4; y*+?k\*
 k\ 
' "•! l ! PMldinn at}
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Y>;.... •
 X ' 
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subject to the parking privileges under the contract was a breach 
of duty not to interfere. 
The agreement had all the necessary requirements for 
recording -- acknowledged signatures and property description --
and it is thus readily apparent that had Horman recorded the 
agreement in March, 1976, after Clark signed it for defendant, 
it would have constituted notice to all that the contracted for 
parking rights were an encumbrance upon the property and would have 
been included in the provisions of the quoted language set forth 
in the preceding paragraph. Horman has had long experience in 
the acquisition, construction, management, sales and leasing of 
real property and to him the necessity of recording the agreement: 
to protect his interest in the parking iicilities at the center 
•
T
-ust have been well known to him and understood by him. Had he 
done so, this lawsuit would never have been filed. Having failed 
to cio so, can plaintiffs now shi •: t the rospor,. iblity to defendant 
tor the problems and damages that followed? 
While it may be true as alleged by plaintiffs that defendant 
had a duty not "to interfere" with the contractual rights of 
the plaintiffs, neither the sale of the property by defendant 
nor defendant's tailure to either itself record the agreement 
nor to specifically mention the encumbrance in its deed to Wirthlins 
constitutes an interference with plaintiffs1 contract rights. 
*'he tact that. t. he Wirthlins wore bona fide purchasers for value 
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without notice of the unrecorded contract was the determining 
factor in precluding plaintiffs from retaining the parking privileges 
provided for in the contract. 
I find no duty upon the defendant to have recorded the 
agreement. In real estate transactions, it is a grantee's rights 
that are given protection by the recording statutes and that 
protection can only be obtained by the recording. I think the 
responsibility for doing so falls upon the grantee and such has 
long been the practice in real estate transactions. The law 
neither requires nor is it customary that a warranty deed conveying 
real property specifically list all of the valid, existing encumbranc 
of record. That is why title companies exist and that is why 
buyers and sellers both look to title reports to reveal such 
encumbrances of record. 
There is no evidence in this case that defendant knew 
the agreement, with plaintiff had not been recorded when defendant 
entered into the six-sided real estate exchange agreement under 
which defendant sold to the Wirthlins, nor is there any convincing 
evidence that defendant knowingly or intentionally failed to 
disclose the parking privilege encumbrance when that real estate 
exchange agreement was negotiated. As stated supra, both the 
exchange agreement and the warranty deed to the Wirthlins contained 
provisions that would have preserved the parking privilege had 
Herman promptlv recorded the agreement. Plaintiffs abandoned 
thei: prior '-laim that -}<> I • -riiant breached an oral agreement to 
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record the agreement and indeed there was no implied duty to do so, 
nor any obligation to make certain that Horman had done so. 
I thus find no breach of duty by defendant under the agreement 
and must enter a verdict against the plaintiffs and in favor of 
the defendant of no-cause of action. Having so ruled, the issue 
of damages need not be further considered. 
Counsel for defendant shall prepare appropriate Findings, 
Conclusions and Judgment unless the parties by written Stipulation 
otherwise agree as provided in Rule 52(c). 
Dated this ^?£~~ d a y o f J u i y' i934: 
-Al— 
BRYANT' H. L K U M 
DISTRICT JUDGE (Retired) 
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